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ABSTRACT
This essay discusses the historical and evolutionary background of the doctrine of informed consent in medical malpractice
cases in order to provide the reader with a detailed and a unique
comparative perspective of the law in the United States and in
France, along with some cross-references to other legal systems
across the globe.
In order to achieve the desired goal, this paper conducts the
analysis based on a hypothetical situation. Starting from these
facts, the paper shows how and if the American and the French
standards addressing the scope of the physician’s duty to disclose
the risks intrinsic to the procedure draw a proper balance between
the two conflicting interests (i.e., the patient and the physician).
Keeping in mind that the principles of medical ethics and human rights should guide the legal development of the doctrine of
informed consent, it is proposed, in a non-exhaustive manner, that
the addition of two alternative legal standards of disclosure: a
“mixed standard” that should embrace into tort law the notion of
error, as vice of consent, and the shared-medical decision-making,
which involves engaging both the physician and the patient in the
process of deciding on the medical treatment or procedure. These
innovative solutions protect the patient’s ability to obtain the information necessary for an intelligent decision and, at the same
time, provide the physician with a clear understanding of what
necessary information should be disclosed in order to avoid liability based on the doctrine of informed consent.
Keywords: medical malpractice, doctrine of informed consent,
comparative law, information disclosure, American law, French
law, shared medical decision-making, new standards of disclosure
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INTRODUCTION
“Had I known about the risks, I would have made another
choice, but nobody told me. How could I have guessed?” As frequent as this situation might be, it is undeniable that it can be a
painful experience when connected to a medical choice.
Think of the following scenario: while cleaning his home on
Saturday, Paul fell down and injured his right wrist. Though he is
in pain, he is reluctant to run to the emergency room during the
weekend. On Monday morning, he seeks medical assistance at the
Municipal Hospital, where his arm is x-rayed. Dr. Medicus, the
orthopedist, tells Paul that his wrist is broken. “You have two options,” he says. “We can put this hand on a splint or you can have
surgery. If you choose not to have surgery, you must rest this hand
in a horizontal position for at least four weeks.” Dr. Medicus explains that if Paul chooses surgery, the hand will cure faster,
though it might be more painful. Paul does not worry about pain
(there are painkillers) but cares about mobility. He decides to have
the surgery. Dr. Medicus performs the surgery, apparently successfully, but Paul does not recover completely, even with physiotherapy, he keeps some stiffness in one finger. He goes back to Dr.
Medicus, who admits that this is a rare outcome of the procedure
but not a usual risk. “Still, you could have told me of the risk,”
says Paul. “Well, this is such an unusual development. If I told my
patients of all these unusual risks, they would grow such anxiety
that they would not survive the anesthesia. I am afraid you will
have to live with this finger stiffness, which should not bother you
too much unless you are a pianist . . . .”
Dr. Medicus lost his good humor hearing Paul tell him that his
second job was to play the piano in the local orchestra.
Should Dr. Medicus be held liable for failure to disclose the
unusual risk? Should he have guessed that his patient might have
been a pianist on the sole account of him having fine hands? As
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part of the conversation, did the parties have an opportunity to
properly discuss what was at stake, including lifestyle?
All western legal systems are facing these questions, whether
they are civil law or common law jurisdictions. Some systems may
have it as an issue of tort law; others may consider it under contract law. All of the above will be embraced in this paper.
The standard of disclosure will be explored in two leading
common law and civil law jurisdictions: The United States (part I)
and France (part II) in order to provide a broad understanding of
the doctrine of informed consent 1 in a comparative manner. 2 One
may wonder why the United States and France?
Firstly, in the United States, one of the leading jurisdictions of
the common law world, several standards of disclosure have been
identified. Some states 3 give physicians large discretion in choosing the medical procedure, and as a result the patient’s autonomy is
severely diminished. In other states, even if the patient has a certain voice, his right of self-determination is not well-protected as it
is generally assumed that all patients in similar circumstances assess identically the risks and benefits of a medical procedure.
Whether the actual standards of disclosure respond to the needs of
the contemporary American society is a dilemma that has its roots
in a variety of frameworks, including the ethical and juridical underpinnings of the doctrine of informed consent.
Secondly, in France, a jurisdiction all too famous for its seminal Civil Code, the doctrine of informed consent has evolved gradually and consistently, though not by a Civil Code reform.
1. A definition of the doctrine of informed consent explains it as “a negligent concept predicated on the duty of the physician to disclose to a patient information that will enable him to ‘evaluate knowledgeable the options available
and the risks attendant upon each’ before subjecting the patient to a course of
treatment.” See Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (1983).
2. The following part will focus mainly on the development of the physician’s duty to inform the patient in these two jurisdictions, but some references
to other countries will be made as well in order to enhance the comparative approach.
3. For example, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Maine,
Nevada, New York.
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Courts had to step in: the Cour de cassation ruled, in 1998, that
the physician must inform the patient about the serious risks of a
medical procedure and the treatment proposed and that this duty
exists even if the serious risks occur only in exceptional cases. 4
What did lawmakers mean by “serious risks” in 1998? What is to
be understood by that phrase nowadays? What are the differences
and similarities between the French standard and the standards applied in the United States?
It is known that the duty to disclose, implicitly its scope, that
rests upon the physician has developed gradually in the United
States, as well as in France, in order to meet the evolution of society. This paper discusses the historical and evolutionary background
in order to provide the reader with a detailed and unique comparative perspective of the doctrine of informed consent by highlighting that the current standards of disclosure might not be sufficiently evolved to meet the needs of contemporary society.
To achieve the desired goal, based on the hypothetical situation
above-mentioned, this paper will show that as society has changed
over the last few years in the United States, as well as in France,
the patient’s autonomy has become a valuable health care resource.
Therefore, the choice of treatment must be the result of a compromise between the patient’s autonomy and the physician’s obligation to act with beneficence toward the patient. The outcome consists of a communication in which the patient and the physician are
directly and personally engaged. Hence, part III will focus mainly
on discussing two alternative and innovative solutions in order to
adequately protect the patient’s ability to obtain the information
necessary for an intelligent decision and, at the same time, provide
the physician with a clear understanding of what necessary infor-

4. Cass. Civ. 1, 7 October 1998, Bull. Civ. I, no. 287, at 291; JCP 1998,
11, 10179 (concl. J. Sainte-Rose, note P. Sargos).
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mation should be disclosed in order to avoid liability based on the
doctrine of informed consent. 5
Though we are aware that the patient may also bring criminal
or disciplinary actions against the physician, the paper will focus
on civil liability. It will not address the issue of whether the hospital has a (non) duty to obtain the patient’s consent. The focus will
be on the duty that the physician has to the patient involved in a
medical procedure. This paper will only refer to the informed consent of legally competent patients, in normal circumstances of clinical care and not in emergency situations.
I. THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Origins of the Doctrine of Informed Consent
In the United States, two major legal adjustments have been
made to meet the needs of an evolving medical system. In the past,
a patient who had been the victim of injury by physicians could file
a civil battery lawsuit. 6 Battery is defined as “an intentional tort
that protects a person’s interest in being free from physical contact

5. We are not of the opinion that the physician should have indefinite discretion in making a choice for the patient’s treatment (as it was considered under
the traditional paternalistic approach. For instance, for a presentation of this approach in the Israeli legal system, see Yehiel S. Kaplan, The right of a Minor in
Israel to Participate in the Decision-Making Process Concerning His or Her
Medical Treatment, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1085, 1086-87 (2002). Therefore, it
is mandatory to impose a standard, whether a judicial or a legislative one, in
order to consolidate the “partnership” between the physician and the patient. See
Leonard J. Nelson III, in 5 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.04 (David W. Louisell
& Harold Willians eds. 2016). The traditional paternalistic approach can be seen
in Romanian law as well: see Emese Florian, Discuții în legătură cu
răspunderea civilă a personalului medical pentru neîndeplinirea obligației
privitoare la consimțământul informat al pacientului, 8 DREPTUL 30, 31 (2008)
(Ro.).
6. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14-16 (Minn. 1905). In this case,
the patient consented to an operation on her right ear. During the surgery, the
physician considered that the left ear should be the one operated because it was
in a more serious condition and proceeded with the operation on the left ear only. The patient sued the surgeon for the tort of assault and battery based on the
theory of lack of consent. The court awarded damages to the patient because she
gave no consent to the surgery on the left ear, thus the operation was unlawful.
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with his or her person.” 7 Historically, this course of action was
taken due to the fact that the physician failed to obtain the patient’s
consent to an invasive course of treatment, 8 because it was contended that “[t]he physician’s need to obtain the consent of the patient to surgery derived from the patient’s right to reject a nonconsensual touching.” 9 Therefore, battery was the proper and the efficient cause of action for the protection of the patient’s interest in
being free from unconsented touching. 10 The real focus in these
early cases was on the right to bodily integrity, rather than on selfdetermination. 11
To conclude, the common law world faced with practical situations in which the physician failed to inform the patient about the
risks of a certain medical procedure, had to find an equitable solution for the innocent victim. Wisely using the juridical tools that
were available at a certain point in the past, and with the awareness
that the law evolves empirically in the United States, the courts
decided that, for the time, battery was the appropriate cause of action. 12
Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospitals 13 adopted a slightly different view and stated that:
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has the right
to determine what shall be done with his own body.” Thus, the accent was not placed so much on the unwanted touching (meaning
7. FRANK L. MARAIST ET. AL., TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA
PERSPECTIVES 25 (2d ed. 2015). The United States maintains the old boundary
between intentional torts and negligence. See also id. at 15. Battery, assault,
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to land,
trespass to chattel etc. are, in a common law jurisdiction, included in the category of intentional torts, viewed as a tort theory of recovery for the innocent plaintiff against the intentional tortfeasor.
8. Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 456 (1999).
9. Id. at 460.
10. Id.
11. Jaime S. King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent:
The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 438
(2006).
12. Matthies, 733 A.2d at 460.
13. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914) (surgeon performing an operation without the patient’s consent).
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the lack of consent), which is the very essence of the battery, but
rather on the violation of the bodily integrity. 14 Courts noticed that
equity requires imposing liability upon physicians, and because the
doctrine of informed consent was not yet adopted, the cause of action of battery was a practical alternative. Moreover, generally,
physicians did not have the requisite intention to harm patients;
rather they failed to provide the necessary information “in the relatively good faith for the benefit of the patient.” 15 Being so, a shift
from battery to negligence standard was definitely needed. 16
Later, under the theory of negligence, the doctrine of informed
consent may hold the physician liable “regardless of whether the
injuries were the consequence of negligence or otherwise.” 17 Negligence is defined as follows: “a conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others.” 18
The doctrine of informed consent requires that, in the absence
of an emergency, the physician must inform the patient about: “(1)
14. Id.; the court, in this case, just wanted to impose an absolute duty on
physicians to inform patients of what was going to be done. JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 49, 52 (2002). This right was not broad
enough as it encompassed only the right of refusal. However, the case “neither
invited nor required a sophisticated examination of the relationship between
disclosure and consent on one hand, and self-determination, on the other.” This
approach was “still decades away.”
15. Id. at 68.
16. Courts have recognized that “the need for patient’s consent is better
understood as deriving from the right of self-determination” rather than an unauthorized touching or bodily integrity. See, e.g., Matthies, 733 A.2d at 460. See
also KATZ, supra note 14, at 69. Jay Katz, an American physician and a law
professor, stated a number of reasons why, ordinarily, judges have rejected the
theory of battery. Firstly, the inexistence of many defences as a remedy to battery, which might put the physician in a vulnerable position. Secondly, actual
medical practice, rather than a judicial theory, is taken into account by judges in
order to form the legal standard. Thirdly, the theory of negligence will help physicians liable only for failure to disclose information that would have been provided by other physicians. Last, but not least, the patient in a negligence claim
will have a higher burden of proof to make sure no frivolous claims are filed.
17. Housh v. Morris, 818 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (A.L.I. 1979) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
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the diagnosis; (2) the general nature of the contemplated procedure; (3) the risks involved; (4) the prospects of success; (5) the
prognosis if the procedure is not performed; and (6) alternative
medical treatments.” 19
These broad requirements do not offer a clear and certain
standard as to what type of risks the duty to disclose extends. In the
interest of finding out the sphere of coverage of this duty and accordingly the correlative interest of the patient to be informed, we
will have to use the adjustable legal microscope and examine the
“plate” consisting of case law and legislation from different states
in the United States.
B. Contemporary Development: The Standard of Disclosure
Most states have generally adopted the negligence theory of the
doctrine of informed consent. 20 Thus, the patient has a distinct
cause of action 21 under the doctrine of informed consent. 22 Still,
there are also states in which the action for lack of consent is treated as an action based on battery. 23

19. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04 (citing Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896
A.2d 777, 778 (2006)).
20. For details, see Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.11.
21. Swiss law is another example in which the action for failure to obtain
informed consent is a distinct cause of action. See Corrine Widmer Lüchinger,
Medical Liability in Switzerland, in MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE: A
COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 547, 579 (Bernhard A. Koch ed.
2011).
22. See, e.g., Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2010)
(quoting Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 111 n.4 (Wyo. 1989)): “While battery
still ‘remains applicable where a treatment or procedure was completely unauthorized . . . negligence principles [now] apply to the more often encountered
situation where the treatment or procedure was authorized but the consent was
uninformed.’”
23. Pennsylvania is an example of such a jurisdiction. See Pomroy v. Hosp.
of the Univ. of Pa., 105 A.3d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). Courts decided that
“[t]here is no cause of action in Pennsylvania for negligent failure to gain informed consent” by referring to Kelly v. Methodist Hospital, 664 A.2d 148, 150
(Pa. Super. 1995). It was also decided that “[l]ack of informed consent is the
legal equivalent to no consent” (quoting Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798
A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 2002)).
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Without ignoring the states that treat lack of consent as a battery claim, the focus of this paper will be on the right of action for
negligence. 24 Hence, liability will be imposed if, before engaging
into a medical procedure, the physician fails to provide sufficient
relevant information in order to enable the patient to give his “intelligent consent.” 25 In Salgo, a 55 year-old man consulted Dr.
Gerbode, a specialist in the surgical treatment of arterial diseases,
because he complained about severe cramping pains in his legs. 26
Dr. Gerbode told the patient that his circulatory situation was quite
serious, but he did not explain to the plaintiff all of the various
possibilities of the proposed procedures. 27 The physician performed an aortography procedure, which departed, at that time,
from the standard of care. 28 The surgery went well, but on the following day, both of his legs were in an irreversible paralyzed condition. 29 The court in this case did not clarify the standard of care
that should be imposed. 30 After ruling, Judge Bray stated that “a
physician violates his duty to the patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment;” 31 and he granted discretion to the physicians regarding the
necessary facts about which proper information must be given. 32
What are the elements of a prima facie case in the common law
negligence theory? The plaintiff, i.e., the patient, is required to
24. The theory of battery applies nowadays to situations in which the medical procedure was performed without the consent of the patient. See Pizzalotto v.
Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859, 863 (La. 1983): “Thus, an unauthorized operation that
is skillfully performed still constitutes a battery.” See also Cobbs v. Grant, 502
P.2d 1, 8 (1972): “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances
when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.”
25. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d
170, 181 (1957).
26. Id. at 173.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 181.
32. Id.
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prove as part of the prima facie case: the existence of a duty, a
breach of that duty, proximate cause or causation, and injury. 33
Regarding causation, the patient has to prove that the physician’s
failure to provide the requisite information was the proximate
cause of the patient’s injuries 34 and that the patient would have refused to undergo the medical procedure had the information been
disclosed. 35
Without any intent of minimizing the importance of the other
elements of a lawsuit based on lack of informed consent, this paper
will focus on the criteria used to measure the physician’s duty to
disclose information to the patient.
Generally, the standard of care requires physicians to “inform a
patient of the dangers of, possible negative consequences of, and
alternatives to a proposed treatment or procedure.” 36 However,
how is this abstract standard measured in concreto?
In the United States, there are two major lines of cases addressing the scope of the physician’s duty to disclose the risks inherent
in medical procedures. 37
The traditional negligence standard, known also as the “professional standard,” 38 is mainly opened to the wisdom and the practical experience of the physicians. Hence, one may say that the patient’s autonomy is not well protected. Are there valid arguments
to contradict or sustain this statement? How did doctrinal criticism
contribute to the development of the doctrine of informed consent?
In recent years, many states have alternatively adopted a new
standard, known as the “prudent patient standard.” 39 Does the new
standard adequately protect the patient’s interests? What are the
predictions for the evolution of this saga? Does this new standard
33. 70 C.J.S. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS § 122, 1 (2015). See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 281-282.
34. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 440.
35. Id. at 441.
36. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 440.
37. Id. at 439-45.
38. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.05.
39. Id.
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indicate the end of the old controversy or the beginning of a new
paradigm?
1. The Professional Standard
The professional standard 40 states that the physician’s duty is
determined by the prevailing practice in the community. The question is as follows: what would a reasonable physician disclose to a
patient under similar circumstances? 41
This standard, also known as the “professional theory,” 42 has
been adopted in many states whether judicially (see for example:
Arizona, 43 Arkansas, 44 Colorado, 45 Indiana, 46 Maine, 47 Nevada, 48
North Carolina, 49 Texas, 50 Virginia, 51 Wyoming 52) or by statute53
(see for instance: Florida, 54 Nebraska, 55 New York, 56 and Vermont 57).
When a patient files a lawsuit for breach of informed consent,
as part of the prima facie case, the plaintiff has to establish the existence of a duty on the part of the physician. This can be achieved
40. Justice Schroeder expressed a rationale for this approach. See Natanson
v. Kline, 350 P.2d. 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).
41. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.05.
42. Curran v. Buser, 271 Neb. 332, 711 N.W.2d 562 (2006).
43. McGrady v. Wright, 729 P.2d 338 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
44. Brumley v. Naples, 896 S.W.2d 860, 864 (1995); Fuller v. Starnes, 597
S.W.2d 88 (1980).
45. Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d 423, 428 (Colo. 1997).
46. Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 2009).
47. Ouellette v. Mehalic, 534 A.2d 1331 (Me. 1988).
48. Bronneke v. Rutherford, 89 P.3d 40, 45-46 (Nev. 2004); Smith v. Cotter, 810 P.2d 1204 (1991).
49. Starnes v. Taylor, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968).
50. Sherrill v. McBride, 603 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App. 1980).
51. Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 778-779 (2001).
52. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989); Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d
1244, 1255 (10th Cir. 2010).
53. There are jurisdictions in which the legal requirements of the doctrine of
informed consent have been developed in case law as well as in statute. See,
e.g., for Sweedish law, Lüchinger, supra note 21, at 547, 579.
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103 (West 2012).
55. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2816 (2014).
56. N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 2805-d(1) (2014).
57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(a)(1) (2014).
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by proof that a “reasonable prudent practitioner” acting in the physician’s position, would have provided additional information. As
the physician failed to disclose sufficient relevant information to
the patient, he breached his duty.
How the physician discharges his obligation to inform the patient is “primarily a question of medical judgment.” 58 Therefore,
the courts held that the patient has to prove that a professional custom exists (hence, the defendant’s departure from that standard) by
relying on medical expert testimony. 59 The rationale for this approach: establishing that a physician breached his duty is rarely
“sufficiently obvious as to lie within common knowledge.” 60
The professional standard is said to have two main justifications. 61 Firstly, because disclosure of the risks is regarded as a professional judgment, it is contended that the physician is in the best
position to estimate the effects of the disclosure of certain risks on
the patient. 62 Secondly, the physician cannot afford to waste time
in order to inform the patient about every possible risk to protect
himself from liability. 63
Courts have criticized the professional standard because it provides unlimited discretion to the physician. 64 Furthermore, some
object that the standard “undercuts the value of autonomy” 65 of the
patient, which stands as one of the foundations of the doctrine of
informed consent. 66
What would be the result if the professional standard was applied to the hypothetical case presented above? If the physician
58. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d. 1093, 1106 (1960).
59. See, e.g., Copenhaver v. Miller, 537 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1989) (citing Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So.2d
596 (Fla. 1987)).
60. Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1130 (Me. 1980) (citing Cox v.
Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620, 622 (Me. 1979)).
61. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d 1, 10.
65. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.
66. Id.
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does not have knowledge of the patient’s preferences and lifestyle,
then it is more probable than not, taking into consideration the cases discussed in this section, that the custom in the medical field
would have dictated that the physician, Dr. Medicus, did not have
the duty to disclose the risk of nerve damage. This is because it
represented a minor risk to the medical community and it was too
remote in regard to the medical procedure performed. For example,
there are many serious risks associated with a medical invasive
procedure that are required, by the medical custom, to be disclosed: infections, bleeding, side effects to anesthesia, etc. Disclosing every single risk of the procedure, regardless of how remote
and unlikely it is to occur, would likely result in constant refusal of
treatment. Such behavior of the patients is not desirable in a modern and developed society. However, in case the patient communicates his preferences and lifestyle, then the physician might be under customary obligation to disclose even the unusual risks associated with the information provided by the patient. Taking into account that Paul, due to anxiety and stress, might not have communicated efficiently his preferences, it is difficult to say whether Dr.
Medicus would have disclosed the risk of stiffness of one finger.
Whereas this standard protects the physician from liability, it does
not provide an adequate tool for the respect of the patient’s autonomy. However, even if Paul informed Dr. Medicus about his second job as a pianist, it would be very hard for the plaintiff to prove
the existence of a professional custom (admitting that such custom
exists), which would impose on the physician the disclosure of
such risks. Should society, i.e., the policy makers and the judges,
allow such unfairness? Perhaps this was one of the reasons that the
law evolved over time and a new standard was developed.
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2. The Prudent Patient Standard
Under the prudent patient standard, the physician’s duty to disclose is determined by the information needs of a prudent patient
in similar circumstances. 67 The patient’s needs are “the information material to his decision” 68 to undergo a proposed therapy.
The plaintiff is not required to present expert testimony in order to establish a professional standard 69 (under the duty element),
as part of the prima facie case. 70 Consequently, the patient must
show that “the probability of the type of harm is a risk which a reasonable person would consider in deciding on treatment” 71 or the
jury must determine, based on the “credibility of the plaintiff’s testimony” 72 whether he would have refused the treatment, had he
been informed about the risks of the medical procedure. 73 Correspondingly, the determination of materiality is a question for the
trier of fact and does not require expert testimony. 74
In order to determine whether particular information is material
to the decision of the patient, the courts have utilized two standards: the objective or the subjective patient-based standard. 75
a. The Objective Patient-Based Standard
In 1972, the courts of the United States elaborated a new standard—the prudent patient objective standard—in two landmark cases.

67. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.05.
68. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
69. For the need of the elimination of expert testimony with respect to the
standard of care, see Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783.
70. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.
71. Britt v. Taylor, 852 So. 2d 1128, 1135 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
72. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979).
73. Id.
74. Marsingill v. O'Malley, 128 P.3d 151, 158 (Alaska 2006). However, we
have to stress that there is still a need for expert medical testimony with regard
to the “existence and nature of the risk as well as the likelihood of its occurrence.” See Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.
75. Id. at §22.05.
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This approach was firstly adopted in Canterbury v. Spence. 76
The facts presented a nineteen-year old boy who had experienced
severe pain between his shoulder blades. 77 The patient underwent
surgery. 78 A day after the operation, the lower half of his body was
paralyzed and he had to be operated. 79 However, he remained paralyzed in the bowel region and had urinal incontinence. 80 The plaintiff contended that the physician had failed to perform his duty to
inform him about any risk of paralysis from the procedure. 81 He
brought a negligence suit, claiming that the physician failed to disclose the risks necessary to allow the patient to make an informed
consent relating to the medical procedure. 82 Judge Robinson questioned the feasibility of the professional standard, and reached the
conclusion that it had to be replaced with another standard that will
give patients a larger role in determining whether to undergo a certain medical procedure. 83
According to the objective patient-based standard, the scope of
the standard is “not subjective as to either the physician or the patient.” 84 The test whether a particular risk must be disclosed to the
patient is “its materiality to the patient’s decision,” 85 meaning that
all risks that might influence the decision must be revealed. 86 The
materiality of the standard is defined as what “a reasonable person,
in what physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster the
risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.” 87
76. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.
77. Id. at 776.
78. Id. at 777.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 778.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 786.
84. Id. at 787.
85. Id. at 786.
86. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 442.
87. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Tomas W.
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U.L. REV. 628, 639-40
(1970)).
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The court in Canterbury expressed the need for a change with
respect to the standard of disclosure. Firstly, it held that “the patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to
reveal.” 88 Secondly, the court finds “formidable obstacles” 89 to
accept that the duty to disclose is limited by the custom in the medical practice. 90 To sustain this statement, Judge Robinson contended that “a professional consensus on communication of option and
risk information to patients is open to serious doubt.” 91 Moreover,
the court acknowledged the deficiency of the professional standard
that “physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.” 92 In
conclusion, the court calls for a “standard set by law rather than
one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves”93
in order to respect the patient’s right of self-determination. 94
Then, Canterbury v. Spence was followed by Cobbs v. Grant. 95
The facts in this case suggest that a patient had his spleen removed
after it had been injured in a previous surgery that was performed
because of the plaintiff’s duodenal ulcer. 96 The plaintiff filed a suit
claiming that the physician failed to disclose the inherent risk of
the initial surgery, which led the patient to give a “vitiated consent” to the procedure. 97 The court held that “an objective test is
preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient’s position have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils.” 98

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 786.
Id. at 783.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 245.
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This standard was aimed at protecting the patient’s autonomy99
and, at the same time, at assuring that physicians are not exposed
to “the whims and idiosyncrasies of individual patients.” 100 However, the objective patient-based standard assumes that all patients
assess the risks and benefits of a medical procedure similarly, 101
which is obviously far from true. 102
Moreover, in Canterbury, Judge Robinson distinguishes between “the special and general standard aspects of the physicianpatient relationship” 103 for the purpose of the duty to disclose. On
the one hand, when a physician has to make a medical judgment
(in which case the special standard controls), the court in Canterbury gives “great deference to the physicians’ decisions.” 104 On the
other hand, the court does not give further indication on how medical judgment is defined or what criteria should be used in order to
distinguish between medical and non-medical judgments. 105 Then,
we ask ourselves: did the law really get to the point where the selfdetermination of the patient is well protected and the physician is
given rigorous standards to rely on in order to avoid medical liability? Maybe some more steps need to be taken.
Applying the objective patient-based standard to the hypothetical, the plaintiff will not be required to prove, by medical experts,
the existence of a standard of care. However, even if the burden of
proof seems to be lighter, a reasonable person would be unlikely to
99. However, there is also an opposite opinion expressed in the doctrine.
See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 14, at 76.
100. See King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443, 458. Although the physician might seem to be protected if the objective patient-based standard is applied, such a conclusion might be deceitful. There are some difficulties on the
part of the physician to know a priori what does a reasonable patient expect to
be informed about before he gives his consent to a medical procedure. Thus,
“the idea that all physicians and patients drew the same bright lines distinguishing those ‘material’ risks from ‘immaterial’ risks is misleading.”
101. Id. at 443.
102. See KATZ, supra note 14, at 76: “The belief that there is one ‘reasonable’ or ‘prudent’ response to every situation inviting medical intervention is
nonsense, from the point of view of both the physician and the patient.”
103. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785.
104. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443.
105. Id.
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attach so much significance to the minor loss of the finger’s mobility. For Paul, the patient who plays in the local orchestra, the unwanted outcome of the procedure affects his life, thus the risk of
loss of mobility would have been, for him, a relevant one, that
should have been disclosed by the physician prior to the procedure.
Under these facts, if the patient would file a suit, it is likely that he
would not receive compensation because the physician did not
breach the standard of care established on the basis of a reasonable
patient. A reasonable patient might have placed more importance
on the element of fast recovery, rather than on the particular risk
that was not disclosed. Hence, this example shows that there are no
black or white risks, but in lieu that the “risks exist only in shades
of grey.” 106
b. The Subjective Patient-Based Standard
In 1979, in Scott v. Bradford, 107 Justice Doolin of the Oklahoma Supreme Court established a subjective patient-based standard,
which was aimed at enhancing the patient’s autonomy, as “the law
does not permit a physician to substitute his judgment for that of
the patient by any form of artifice.” 108
Under a subjective patient-based standard, the physicians could
be held negligent for failing to obtain an informed consent if the
plaintiff is able to prove that knowing the material risks would
have made him refuse to undergo the medical procedure. 109 Hence,
the material risk is the one that would “be likely to affect a patient’s decision.” 110
106. Id. at 449 (citing August Piper, Jr., Truce on the Battlefield: A proposal
for a Different Approach to Medical Informed Consent, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
301, 303).
107. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556 (Okla. 1979). The facts of the case
state that the plaintiff’s wife underwent surgery for removal of the uterine tumors that she had developed. The plaintiff contended that the physician did not
disclose the risks involved or available alternatives to surgery.
108. Id.
109. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443.
110. Scott, 606 P.2d at 558.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the “reasonable patient
standard” in favor of a subjective approach, in order to adequately
protect the injured patient. 111 The objective patient-based standard,
although it was at that time the rule of the majority, has been criticized by commentators arguing that a particular patient, after being
given a proper disclosure of the risks, would have declined the
therapy proposed, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances
would have consented, then the patient’s right of selfdetermination is “irrevocably lost.” 112
The merit of the subjective patient-based standard stands for
the fact that it focuses on the particular needs of each patient, requiring the physician to disclose the peculiar risks which that patient, in that position, in that moment would consider “material”
for his decision to undergo the therapy.
However, the subjective patient-base standard was criticized
because it eliminated the protection (if any) 113 that the physicians
were benefiting from with regard to the objective standard, as the
latter required them to disclose “only what a ‘reasonable’ patient
would want to know.” 114 Furthermore, it was contended that the
subjective standard might preclude recovery for lack of proper disclosure if the patient died after the medical procedure was done. 115
Moreover, even if the subjective standard best reflects “the ethical
and legal foundation” 116 of the doctrine of informed consent, it
fails because it lacks the certainty that physicians need to properly
perform their tasks regarding the disclosure of the material risks.117
How could the physician predict the information that the patient
would consider relevant? However, because the physician is rarely
able to anticipate the values and the preferences of the particular
111. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443-44.
112. Scott, 606 P.2d at 559.
113. For details, see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
114. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443.
115. Id. at 444 (citing Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119,
122 (Tenn. 1990)).
116. Id. at 445.
117. Id.

2017]

DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL RISKS

193

patient, the law should not put such a burden on the practitioners of
Hippocratic medicine.
Does the subjective patient-based standard provide a better solution to the hypothetical case that was exposed previously? The
risk of having the finger’s mobility reduced, for Paul, a piano player at the orchestra, is definitely a relevant one to be taken into consideration when consent is given. Thus, under this standard, the
patient would recover under the doctrine of informed consent for
the physician’s failure to disclose the risk. However, if the physician is new in town and does not know and has no reasons to know
that Paul is a piano player (and therefore, the risk is deemed to be
material for the patient), should the law impose an omniscient
knowledge on Dr. Medicus in order to protect the patient’s autonomy? We hold the opinion that the policy behind every law (where
two different interests are conflicting) is to draw a proper balance
in order to achieve a feasible solution. Nevertheless, how should
this be done?
II. THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE IN FRANCE
Based on the ideas expressed by Portalis in a famous speech, 118
one may argue that changes in society, i.e., practice of medicine,
should have an echo in the legal evolution and this should apply to
the doctrine of informed consent.
This part will focus on the country of good pastries and delicious wine in order to illustrate how the “codified law” 119 responds
118. Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, Discours préliminaire du premier projet de
Code civil (2014), https://perma.cc/E3WB-ER57 (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
119. Even if Anglo-American private law shows some repugnance with respect to the concept of codification (see, e.g., Robert A. Pascal, A Summary Reflection on Legal Education, 69 LA. L. REV. 125, 133 (2008)), Simon Taylor
stresses that “[c]odification of the patient’s rights to information in France
should have a symbolic role in promoting the position of the patient in his relationship with the medical professional.” See also Simon Taylor, Cross-Border
Patients and Informed Choices on Treatment in English and French Law and
the Patient’s Rights Directive, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW 467,
474 (2012). On the other hand, the author mentions that this “symbolic and didactic role for the patients” is much more difficult to see in English case law.
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(or not) to the needs of the contemporary society, i.e., the special
relationship between the physician and the patient with respect to
the standard of disclosure present in the doctrine of informed consent.
One may feel the need to establish the type of liability that the
physician is held to in case he fails to perform the duty to disclose
the necessary information to the patient. Considering this issue, the
French law had an interesting development.
To begin with, under French law, physicians were held liable
under tort law (fault-based liability). 120 Then, after the 1936 ruling
of the Cour de Cassation in the famous case, Mercier, 121 the medical malpractice liability, in the private sector, was viewed as a
“matter of contract law.” 122 Under this theory, the physician’s obligation was “not described as an obligation of result (obligation de
résultat),” 123 but as an obligation of means (obligation de moyens). 124 Thus, the physician had to comply with the Mercier test,
which provides that the doctor must act with “attentive and conscientious care and, subject to exceptional circumstances, consistent
with established scientific knowledge.” 125 The practical distinction
between the obligations of result 126 and the obligation of means127

120. Florence G’Sell-Macrez, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in
France. Part I: the French Rules of Medical Liability since the Patients’ Rights
Law of March 4, 2002, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2011). By that time,
physician’s liability was based on article 1382 of the French Civil Code. Article
1382 is found in “Title IV. Obligations Arising Without Agreement, Chapter II.
Delicts and Quasi-Delicts: Every act whatever of man that causes damage to
another, obliges him by whose fault it occurred to repair it,” translated in
Legifrance translations https://perma.cc/G9VV-5NN8 (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
121. Cass. Civ. 1, 20 May 1936, D.P. I 1936, 1, 88 (concl. Matter, rapp. L.
Josserand); GAZ. PAL. 1936, 2, 41 (note A. Besson).
122. G’Sell-Macrez, supra note 120, at 1096.
123. Olivier Moréteau, France, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2010 175, 177
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2010).
124. Id.
125. Id. This test was later enshrined in the Code de la Santé Publique [Public Health Code] (Fr.) arts. R 4127-32 by Decree no. 2004-802 of July 29, 2004.
126. An obligation of result exists “whenever the performance or object of
the performance is so precisely determined as to amount to a definite result to be
achieved.” ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR ET AL., LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: A
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is that, while in the first situation it suffices for the obligee (the patient) to prove that the result has not been attained, in the latter
case, the patient has to show that the physician acted with negligence, which is a more difficult burden of proof. 128
The analysis of the physician’s failure to inform the patient under contractual theory of liability is not unknown to United States
law. However, the courts hold that it is unlikely that the physicians
will guarantee a certain result of a medical procedure, 129 thus enter
into a contract with the patients. Even so, there are cases in which
the court found that a contractual link was created by the physician-patient relationship. 130 Hence, the breach of the physician’s
duty was treated as a breach of contract. 131
In 2010, the Cour de Cassation 132 held the physician liable for
failure to inform the patient based on article 16, 16-3 paragraph 2,
and article 1382 of the Civil Code.133 Thus, it appears that the liability of the physician is based on tort law (article 1382, liability
for fault), rather than on a contractual basis (which has been the
rule since the Mercier case in 1936). 134
The impact of the 2010 revirement de jurisprudence (or overruling) was thought not to have “a major practical consequence.” 135 In supporting this argument, it was contended that, except for the prescription issues regarding bodily injury that have
METHODOLOGICAL & COMPARATIVE PROSPECTIVE, CASES, TEXTS AND
MATERIALS 41 (Carolina Acad. Press 2013).
127. Id. An obligation of means or diligence can be defined as a situation
“when an obligor is expected to use the best possible means available to him, or
to act with outmost care and diligence in the performance of his obligation but
without guaranteeing a definite result.”
128. HENRI MAZEAUD ET. AL., LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS 13-15
(9th ed., Montchrestien 1998).
129. Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973).
130. Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929).
131. Id.
132. Cass. Civ. 1, 3 June 2010, Bull. Civ. I, no. 573; D. 2010, 1522 (note P.
Sargos).
133. See English version, available at https://perma.cc/G9VV-5NN8 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2016).
134. Moréteau, supra note 123, at 177.
135. Id. at 178.
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already been eliminated under the Law of March 4, 2002 (also
known as the Patients’ Rights Law 136), the patient’s burden of
proof did not change. Thus, the plaintiff still has to provide evidence of the negligence on the part of the physician, 137 similar to
the situation in which the patient has to prove that the physician
did not execute his contractual obligation of means. 138
A. What is the Legal Basis for the Duty to Inform?
In France, the Civil Code “is phrased in the form of general
rules” 139 and special provisions can be found in other codes, such
as the Public Health Code (Code de la santé publique) or statutes
that cover specific areas of law. The “positive law,” meaning the
law enacted by the legislature, 140 should be seen in the view of jurisprudence.

136. Id. Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la
qualité du systéme de santé [Law 2002-303 of March 4, 2002, on Patients’
Rights and the Quality of the Health System], [hereinafter the Patients’ Rights
Law of March 4, 2002] which was incorporated into the Code de la Santé
Publique [Public Health Code]. The law aimed at unifying the medical malpractice liability rules, regardless if one party belongs to the private or to the public
sector.
137. The question of causation as an element of the prima facie case of negligence can be posed differently in distinct civil law jurisdictions. For example,
in Austria, the patient cannot recover if the defendant can prove that he would
have undergone the medical procedure had he known all possible risks and
complications thereof. See Lüchinger, supra note 21, at 1, 29, 547, 579. This
element is also known as “the hypothetical consent” in Swiss law. However, in
France, the difficulty in establishing the causational link has been reduced by the
French courts’ adoption of the notion of “loss of chance.” Taylor, supra note
119, at 477-78. Actually, French courts have changed the notion of the injury in
order to meet the standard of causation. Commentators of the French case, Cass.
Civ. 1, 3 June 2010, supra note 132, seem to be uncertain of the need for the
Supreme Court to award compensation for any failure to inform the patient (See,
e.g., Patrice Jourdain, Le manquement au devoir d'information médicale cause
un préjudice qui doit être réparé (revirement de jurisprudence), RTDCiv 2010,
571, 573).
138. See supra note 126 for the definition of the obligation of result; see also
supra note 127 for the definition of the obligation of means.
139. Olivier Moréteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis:
The Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 273,
274 (1995).
140. Id. at 276.
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For the first time, the duty to inform was imposed on the physician by the Cour de Cassation in the Teyssier decision. 141 The
court stated that the physician has to, except for emergency cases,
obtain an informed consent prior to the surgery. 142 This duty is imposed in accordance with the respect given to the human being. If
the physician violates the duty to disclose, he will be held liable. 143
In 2001, the Cour de Cassation 144 held that the duty to inform
the patient has its fundament in the requirement to respect the constitutional principle of the human dignity. 145 Even though the
French Constitution does not contain expressis verbis the physician’s duty to disclosure, the principle of human dignity derives its
constitutional value from the preamble’s reference to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. 146
Moreover, article 16 of the Civil Code, 147 states that the law interdicts the infringement of the person’s dignity and guarantees
respect for the human being from the beginning of his life. 148
141. Cass. Civ. 1, 28 January 1942, D. 1942, 63. Teyssier, a professional
driver, was injured in a car accident. At the hospital, he was diagnosed with a
broken left hand. There were two surgical procedures to choose from: treatment
by plaster cast and osteosynthesis. The latter operation was performed. The outcome was not favorable to the patient, as he developed high fever and other
complications which imposed the amputation of the hand. There was no breach
with respect to the standard of care for the performance of the surgery. However, the court held that the patient should have been informed about the consequences of the surgery in order for him to be able to give his consent. Thus, the
physician was held liable for the failure to provide the information necessary to
the patient.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Cass. Civ. 1, 9 October 2001, Bull. Civ. I, no. 252; D. 2001, 3470 (note
D. Thouvenin).
145. Pierre Sargos, Portée d’un revirement de jurisprudence au sujet de
l’obligation d’information du médecin, D. 2001, 3470.
146. The Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution states that: “The French
people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789 . . .” translated in CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER 4, 1958, https://perma.cc/HG2X-9JNL (Conseil constitutionnel) (last visited Mar. 6, 2016)).
147. This article did not exist at the time of Teyssier, as it was first enacted in
1994.
148. C. CIV. art. 16 (Fr.), available at https://perma.cc/2BSW-2CXN (last
visited Mar. 6, 2016). Article 16 is found in Book I of Persons, Title I of Civil
Rights, Chapter II of the Respect of the Human Body and states the following:
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Additionally, article 16-3 of the Civil Code 149 shows that the
inviolability of the human body is not absolute. Thus, exceptions
such as “in case of medical necessity for the person or exceptionally in the therapeutic interest of others” may be regarded as legitimate. However, because these are exceptions to the general rule
presented in article 16, these situations have to be interpreted narrowly.
The presence of the people’s guarantees, both in the Constitution and in the Civil Code, shows the important role that the human
being plays with respect to the legislation. Furthermore, it highlights that the physician cannot be confined to a technician role in
which he just respects the rules of the medical field without any
consideration regarding the patient. 150
B. The Patient’s Right to Information
Even before the enactment of the Patients’ Rights Law, there
was a jurisprudence constant, 151 which imposed on physicians a
heavy duty to inform the patient. 152 In France, the patient’s right to
information was given legislative value by the enactment of the
“Legislation ensures the primacy of the person, prohibits any infringement of the
latter's dignity and safeguards the respect of the human being from the outset of
life.”
149. C. CIV. art. 16-3 (Fr.), available at https://perma.cc/2BSW-2CXN (last
visited Mar. 6, 2016). This article is found in Book I of Persons, Title I of Civil
Rights, Chapter II of the Respect of the Human Body and states the following:
There may be no invasion of the integrity of the human body except in
case of medical necessity for the person or exceptionally in the therapeutic interest of others (Act no. 2004-800, Aug. 6, 2004). The consent
of the person concerned must be obtained previously except when his
state necessitates a therapeutic intervention to which he is not able to
assent.
150. François Villa, Comparaison des jurisprudences rendues en matière de
responsabilité pour défaut d’information, MÉDICINE & DROIT 57, 60 (2013)
(Fr.).
151. For a comparison between the doctrine of stare decisis and jurisprudence constante, see Robert L. Henry, Jurisprudence Constante and Stare Decisis Contrasted, 15 A.B.A J. (1929).
152. Suzanne Carval & Ruth Sefton-Green, Medical Liability in France, in
MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS,
supra note 21, at 207, 213.
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Law of March 4, 2002. The principal elements of the 2002 law
have been incorporated into the French Public Health Code. Art.
L1111-2 paragraph 1 of the Public Health Code states that:
Every person has the right to be informed of his state of
health. This information relates to different investigations,
treatment or preventive action which is proposed, its utility,
possible urgency, the consequences, the frequent and serious risks that are normally foreseeable as well as other possible solutions and the foreseeable consequences in the
event of refusal. Whenever new risks are identified, after
the investigations, treatment or preventive actions have
been carried out, the patient must be informed, except when
it is impossible. 153
The Patients’ Right Law was an important event in the French
legal history. This law has unified the medical malpractice rules in
a civil law system that can be “portrayed as a very positive and
legicentrist” 154 one. To deeply understand the present law that is
composed by multiple pieces that evolved over time, we have to
take a careful look at the roots of the norms and the evolutionary
background of the rules. One should not forget that the French tort
law resides in the continual cooperation between scholars 155 and
the judiciary. 156
How important was the promulgation of the Patients’ Right
Law? Did the law bring a totally new approach to the issue of informed consent in France or just local remedies for the deficiencies
that were noticed? Hereinafter, we will focus our attention on analyzing the law that was in force prior to March 4, 2002 and afterwards.

153. See the following for the text in French, available at https://perma
.cc/6E6K-HJ5W (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
154. Olivier Moréteau, Basic Questions in Tort Law from a French Perspective, in BASIC QUESTIONS IN TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 8
(Helmut Koziol ed., Jan Sramek Verlag 2015).
155. Id., it is important to keep in mind that the French scholars are more
pragmatic than dogmatic.
156. Id.
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C. The Duty to Disclose Before the Patients’ Rights Law of March
4, 2002
With regard to the means of presenting the information to the
patient, the Cour de Cassation 157 held that the physicians must
give “a loyal, clear and appropriate” 158 disclosure of the serious
risks, in order to allow the patient to decide if he wants to undergo
the medical procedure. 159
In 1998, the Cour de Cassation160 defined the scope of the
physician’s duty to disclose. In that case, the person had a vertebral
fracture caused by a fall. 161 Because of the persistent pain, she underwent surgery, which should have been followed by another. 162
In the afternoon, after the first surgery, the left eye had definitively
lost its functionality. 163 This risk was known to be very rare, so the
physician did not inform the patient about it prior to surgery. 164
The patient filed a suit claiming, among other things, the failure of
the physician to inform her about the rare risk of a definitive loss
of an eye’s functionality. 165 The Appellate Court dismissed the suit
holding that the physician only had to disclose the normally foreseeable risks, and because the risk that occurred in this case was a
very rare risk, the physician did not breach his duty by failing to
inform the patient. 166 However, the Cour de Cassation reversed
this decision; it found that the physician did not meet his duty to
disclose. 167 In order to reach this conclusion, the Cour de Cassation held that the physician must inform the patient about the seri157. Cass. Civ. 1, 27 May 1998, Bull. Civ. I, no. 187; D. 1998.530 (note F.
Laroche-Gisserot).
158. Id., the French reads: “une information loyale, claire et appropriée.”
159. See also Cass. Civ. 1, 14 October 1997, JCP 1997, 2, 22942.
160. Cass. Civ. 1, 7 October 1998, supra note 4.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Patrice Jourdain, Obligation d'information du médecin: extension confirmée de l'obligation aux risques exceptionnels graves, RTDCiv 1999, 111.
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ous risks of the investigations and the treatment proposed and that
this duty exists even if the serious risks occur only in exceptional
cases. 168
This leaves the question of what is the definition of a “serious
risk.” The Cour de Cassation 169 defined the serious risks 170 as “the
risk that might cause death, invalidity or serious aesthetic consequences, considering their impact with respect to the physiological
and social aspect of the patient’s life.” 171 Moreover, if it is clear
that a minor and exceptional risk is not required to be disclosed by
the physician, 172 one may wonder if there is a duty to disclose a
minor risk that is foreseeable?
Patrice Jourdain explains that, according to the Cour de Cassation, one must distinguish the serious risks, which must be disclosed, from the simple “inconvenience” of a medical procedure,
which is not required to be disclosed. 173 This is a fine line and Advocate General Sainte-Rose insisted that this theory of the exceptional risks must be reanalyzed. 174 Thus, in 2002, the standard of
disclosure was (re)defined by the legislature and encompassed in
the Public Health Code.
D. The Duty to Disclose After the Law of March 4, 2002
The Patients’ Rights Law of March 4, 2002 relaxed the previous jurisprudential standard of disclosure 175 in article L. 1111-2
paragraph 1, which does not require the physician to provide ex-

168. Cass. Civ. 1, 7 October 1998, supra note 4.
169. Cass. Civ. 1, 14 October 1997, supra note 159.
170. In French it is “risques graves.”
171. In French: “les risques de nature à avoir des conséquences mortelles,
invalidantes, ou même esthétiques graves compte tenu de leurs répercussions
psychologiques et sociales.” Cass. Civ. 1, 14 October 1997, supra note 159.
172. Jourdain, supra note 167, at 111.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. The rule stated that the physician must inform the patient of the “all
inconvenience that arise” and all risks, even if they are exceptional. G’SellMacrez, supra note 120, at 1101.
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haustive information to the patient. 176 Article L. 1111-2 paragraph
1 imposes on the physician the obligation to inform the patient
about the “frequent risks or the serious but normally predictable
risks.” 177
With respect to the frequency of the risks, administrative courts
in France held that even if a risk is not serious, if it can be regarded
as frequent, then the physician has a duty to disclose it to the patient. 178 Furthermore, there are cases that state that the physician’s
duty to inform is not discharged if the risk is serious, even if it is
not frequent. 179
One may note that there is no legislative definition of what actually constitutes “serious risks.” 180 However, there are cases in
which judges expressed their opinion on what constitutes a serious
risk. 181 A similar definition to the one adopted by the courts is given by the Haute Autorité de santé 182 in its guide to physicians on
what actually can be defined as serious risk 183—“a serious harm 184
is one which is ‘life-threatening or that alters a vital bodily function.’” 185
The definitions that were attributed by the courts and governmental entities to the serious risks would indicate that, in France,
the standard of disclosure is an objective one. Compared to United
States’ law, French law does not provide any solid indication
whether the “seriousness” of the risk is to be treated from the
viewpoint of a reasonable physician, a reasonable patient, or a par-

176. PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU,
CONTRATS 722 (9th ed. 2012).

DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ ET DES

177. G’Sell-Macrez, supra note 120, at 1101.
178. C.A.A. (Cour administrative d’appel; intermediate court of appeal for
administrative law cases) Paris, 12 November 2012, 11PA02031.
179. See, e.g., C.A.A. Lyon, 7 April 2001, 09LY01837.
180. Taylor, supra note 119, at 475.
181. Cass. Civ. 1, 14 October 1997, supra note 159.
182. French National Authority for Health. For details about this entity, see
https://perma.cc/6T3S-2SE2 (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
183. Taylor, supra note 119, at 475.
184. It is just a way to refer to the same serious risk of causing harm.
185. Taylor, supra note 119, at 475.

2017]

DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL RISKS

203

ticular patient. 186 It is thought that French lawyers feel more comfortable with the use of abstract principles than lawyers in common
law. 187 Thus, French society is less concerned to engage in a more
detailed discussion about the type of standard of care that is imposed upon physicians. 188
In accordance with the legislative requirement that the risk has
to be normally foreseeable, courts in France have ruled that a risk
is “normalement prévisible,” 189 even if it is exceptional, if it occurs
in one case out of a thousand cases. 190 Thus, statistical data plays
an important role in the establishment of the foreseeability. Moreover, another factor that courts seemed to have taken into consideration is the health antecedent of the patient. 191
Going back to the hypothetical situation that was presented
above, one may argue that the risk of loss of the finger’s mobility
is not a serious risk from an objective point of view and, more
probable than not, this risk is not frequent. However, if the physician had known about the pianistic activity of the patient (i.e., he
had attended the local orchestra in the past or the patient himself
had disclosed this information to the health care provider), then it
is likely that the risk of stiffness of the finger would be regarded as
serious. This risk affects “the social aspect of the patient’s life.”192
Thus, more probable than not, the physician would be found liable
for the failure to disclose this serious risk to the patient, as he had
knowledge of the patient’s lifestyle and preferences.
A common law scholar may point a finger at the lack the foreseeability on what type of risks are serious and/or frequent and
normally foreseeable. He might also object that decisions of
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The English translation is “normally foreseeable.”
190. C.A.A. Lyon, 23 December 2010, 09LY01051. However, one may note
that in Switzerland, “[i]n general, the statistical risk percentages are not used for
determining the scope of the duty to inform.” Lüchinger, supra note 21, at 580.
191. C.A.A. Nancy, 9 April 2009, 07NC01468.
192. For details, see Cass. Civ. 1, 14 October 1997, supra note 159.
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French courts use brief and cryptic language and it might be only
after the work of a scholar that the entire decision is fully understood. Hence, the physician’s duty and the extent of the patient’s
right to information may seem to him unclear and ambiguous.
III. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS
The legal standards in the United States and in France have undergone impressive improvements with respect to the patient’s
right to self-determination in the sphere of the doctrine of informed
consent. However, there are still areas in which the solutions provided by the law do not correspond to the need of the parties involved, i.e., the physician and the patient. For example, in most
jurisdictions in the United States the standard of disclosure does
not depend upon the lifestyle of the patient, though he is the one
who has to consent to the medical procedure, unless the patient
brings his preferences to the physician’s knowledge. However,
generally, the reasonable prudent practitioner or the reasonable patient is taken into consideration to establish the physician’s duty to
disclose.
A proper legal standard of informed consent should aim at protecting the patient’s ability to obtain the information necessary for
making an intelligent decision, to either decide for him or to defer
the decision-making to the physician. Moreover, the ideal legal
standard should provide the physician with a clear understanding
of what necessary information should be disclosed to the particular
patient in order to avoid liability based on the doctrine of informed
consent. One may ask whether the law in the common law as well
as in the civil law arena could achieve such goals. This part of the
paper will prove that this desideratum is not utopic.
The next part will propose, without aiming to achieve an exhaustive analysis, two possible alternative solutions 193: the modifi193. These alternative solutions are applicable in the United States and in
France.
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cation of the substantive patient-based standard developed by the
courts in the United States and the implementation of a new standard of care, known as the shared medical decision-making.
A. Injecting Objectiveness into the Substantive Patient-Based
Standard
In the United States, the subjective patient-based standard 194
adopted by the court in Scott v. Bradford 195 has been vigorously
criticized because, among other objections, it was contended that it
eliminated the protection given by the objective standard to the
physician, as the latter standard required the physician to disclose
the information deemed relevant to a “reasonable patient.” 196 In
order to overcome this criticism, one may ask whether, by fusing
different legal concepts, the law might find a solution that will
consist of the combination between the objective and the subjective standard. However, is it worth the effort? How many jurisdictions worldwide have implemented the subjective patient-based
standard?
The United States subjective approach of the doctrine of informed consent can be identified, though under different names, in
many other jurisdictions such as Belgium, Germany, or Switzerland. 197
In Belgium, the traditional standard of informed consent, which
stated that the physician must inform the patient about the “normal

194. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443; under the subjective patientbased standard, the physician could be held negligent for failure to obtain an
informed consent if the plaintiff proves that knowing the material risks would
have made him refuse to undergo the medical procedure. Hence, the material
risk is one that would “be likely to affect a patient’s decision.” Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
195. Scott, 606 P.2d. at 558.
196. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443.
197. There might be other jurisdictions in which the subjective patient-based
standard is adopted, but this paper will limit the analysis to these three European
countries.
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and foreseeable” 198 risks, has been criticized for being “too vague
and too abstract.” 199 The more modern standard, so-called the “relevant-risk” 200 theory has been implicitly accepted by the Cour de
Cassation of Belgium. 201 Under this theory, the physician has to
disclose to the patient the risks that are considered relevant for “the
patient in a particular case.” 202 Thus, in Belgium, the United States
subjective patient-based standard has been implemented since
2009.
The law in Germany with respect to the standard of disclosure
is based on the principle of full disclosure. 203 German law emphasizes on the patient’s right to self-determination. 204 Hence, it was
stated that “the decisive element here is the view of the specific
patient in the specific situation, not the view of a ‘reasonable patient.’” 205 Therefore, it is evident that Germany has adopted the
subjective patient-based standard without specifically naming it as
such.
Switzerland is another example where in order for the patient
to give his intelligent consent to a medical procedure, he should be
provided with all the necessary information. 206 With respect to the
standard of disclosure, Swiss law emphasizes that the “individual
patient’s information needs are decisive, not those of a ‘reasonable
patient.’” 207 Hence, Switzerland is an additional jurisdiction in
which the subjective patient-based standard seems to be effective.
198. Herman Nys, Medical Liability in Belgium, in MEDICAL LIABILITY IN
EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 21, at 61, 80.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], 26 June 2009, no.
C070548N, https://perma.cc/P2N4-Z4TY (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
202. Herman Nys, Medical Liability in Belgium, in MEDICAL LIABILITY IN
EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 21, at 80.
203. WALTER VAN GERVEN ET. AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON
NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 319 (2000).
204. Id. at 318.
205. Franz Michael Petry, Medical Liability in Germany, in MEDICAL
LIABILITY IN EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, supra note
21, at 233, 265.
206. Lüchinger, supra note 21, at 547, 580.
207. Id.
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It was contended, in France, that the standard of disclosure is
more likely treated as objective. However, even though there may
be no clear guidelines as to whether the standard of disclosure is
treated from the viewpoint of a reasonable physician, a reasonable
patient, or a particular patient, 208 it is important to notice that, in
1997, the Cour de Cassation showed great concern for the patient’s physiological and social aspects. 209 Thus, from this point of
view, the French standard of disclosure may be regarded as a fusion of the American objective and subjective standard. Therefore,
important steps have been taken in order for the law to evolve accordingly to the changing needs of society. Are these steps
enough? Does the law fully satisfy the evolutionary sociological
aspects of life?
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned references to
different jurisdictions that seem to have adopted the United States
subjective patient-based standard and that major criticism that was
brought to this standard (the elimination of the physician’s protection given by the objective standard), one may argue that injecting
some objectiveness into the subjective standard might be a solution
to the issue. Essentially, this means that the new “mixed” standard
should require the physician to disclose the relevant information to
the particular patient (not to a reasonable patient, as the objective
standard requires), if the obligor of the duty to inform (i.e., the
physician) knows or should have reasonably known that the special
risk is important to the patient.
The structure of the “mixed” standard seems similar to the requirements of error, as a vice of consent. 210 For a definition of error, article 1949 of the Louisiana Civil Code states the following:
“Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without

208. Taylor, supra note 119, at 475.
209. For details, see Cass. Civ. 1, 14 October 1997, supra note 159.
210. For details, see LEVASSEUR ET. AL., supra note 126, at 186-87.
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which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause
was known or should have been known to the other party.” 211
In order to properly examine the issue of error, it is mandatory
to determine the notion and the legal effects of consent: “[c]onsent,
which is the concurrence of the declared will of parties to an
agreement, constitutes an essential element of contract in both the
civil and the common law.” 212 Consent given in order to enter into
a contract can be vitiated by error, thus the contract is annullable. 213 In the United States, as well as in France, the physician’s
liability for failure to disclose the relevant information to the patient is based on tort law. Thus, the notion of error, as a vice of
consent, is inapplicable. However, because we are discussing consent, the provisions of error can be implemented by analogy in the
field of defining the duty to disclose in the doctrine of informed
consent.
The “mixed” standard is not totally unknown to United States
case law. For example, in 1980, a California court in Truman v.
Thomas 214 held that “if the physician knows or should know of a
patient's unique concerns or lack of familiarity with medical procedures, this may expand the scope of required disclosure.”215
However, by using the word “may,” 216 the court seemed to be reluctant to hold this as a mandatory requirement imposed upon the
duty to disclose, but it shows that the idea of injecting subjectivity
into the objective standard may be a practicable solution. 217
By adopting a “mixed” standard, both in the United States and
in France or in any other jurisdiction that implemented the subjective patient-based standard, the goals of the doctrine of informed
211. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1949.
212. Herbert A. Holstein, Vices of Consent in the Law of Contracts, 13 TUL.
L. REV. 362 (1938).
213. Id. at 364.
214. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980).
215. Id. at 906.
216. The use of the word “must,” for example, would have given a more authoritative tone to the rationale.
217. However, this case was decided by applying the objective standard.
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consent are better achieved by applying the actual objective or subjective patient-based standard. Thus, the right of self-determination
of the patient is well protected because he is given the information
regarding the risk that he, as an individual, deems important.
Moreover, the physician is protected by the law as, in case he does
not know or has no reasonable reasons to know that the risk is important to the patient, he will not be held liable for the failure to
disclose such risk. This might imply, on the part of the patient, a
duty to communicate his preferences and values so that the physician is under the legal obligation to disclose the risks associated
with the patient’s lifestyle. However, no obligation to inform the
physician should be imposed on the patient. It should be rather left
at his discretion and if the patient chooses not to inform the physician about his preferences and values, then the consequence will be
that the physician cannot be held liable under the doctrine of informed consent for the failure to disclose the peculiar risks associated with the medical procedure.
How does the “mixed” standard work in the hypothetical scenario previously mentioned? The discussion should start by analyzing whether the physician knew or had reasons to know the patient’s values and preferences (i.e., the fact that he plays the piano,
hence his fingers’ mobility is very important aspect of his lifestyle). If Dr. Medicus knew because the patient told him about his
piano passion or had reasons to know because, for example, Paul is
famous in town for his piano performances, then the risk of nerve
damage should have been disclosed to the patient. In the event that
Dr. Medicus does not disclose the material risk and if the other elements of the action under the doctrine of informed consent are
met, then the physician will be held liable. If, under the circumstances, the physician was unaware of the values and preferences
of the patient, then the physician is not going to be held liable for
the failure to disclose the risk of nerve damage.
In conclusion, even if implementing the “mixed” standard requires more profound research and analysis, from a general point
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of view, it seems to be a feasible standard that achieves the goals
of the doctrine of informed consent better than the actual standards. Apart from the “mixed” standard of disclosure, recently, in
the legal and medical field, a new standard of care started to
evolve, in which both the physician and the patient are protagonists.
B. Shared Medical Decision-Making
The current legal standards of disclosure in the United States
and in France can be visually associated to a one-way road, in
which the physician provides the patient with the information that
a reasonable physician would disclose, 218 or a reasonable patient
would consider material, 219 or the particular patient would deem
important 220 in making the decision to undergo a medical procedure. Nevertheless, one may ask why does the information go just
one way? Why should the patient be deprived of the possibility to
provide the physician with individual concerns or questions, 221 or
emotional preferences, if the patient desires to do so? 222 The theory
that pleads for a two-way “alley” of exchanged information is
known as the shared medical decision-making. 223
A possible definition of the shared medical decision-making is
described as followed: “a process in which the physician shares
with the patient all relevant risk and benefit information on all
treatment alternatives and the patient shares with the physician all
relevant personal information that might make one treatment or

218. Under the objective patient-based standard.
219. Id.
220. As expressed by the subjective patient-based standard.
221. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 466.
222. Ministry of Employment and Solidarity & High Committee on Public
Health, Health in France 306, February 2002 [hereinafter Health in France].
223. Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
85, 89 (2010).
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side effect more or less tolerable than others.” 224 Thereafter, both
parties use the information gathered from the interaction to come
to a mutual medical decision. 225
According to the definition of informed consent, one may view
the process as consisting of three main steps. 226 Firstly, the physician provides accurate and useful information regarding the option
of treatment to the patient and then, the latter shares his preferences and values. 227 Secondly, the physician and the patient engage in a process of shared medical decision-making. 228 Thirdly,
the two parties involved in the medical relationship will decide together the best option that fits the needs of the patient. 229
To begin with, as people differ in their level of medical literacy, level of risk aversion, values, and preferences, etc., 230 they
have to be assisted in clearly identifying whether they deem a specific risk important, so they want that risk to be disclosed by the
physician.
Two different methods—decision aids and decision coach231
es —have been proposed to assist the patients through the decision process by providing them with the adequate information and
helping them discover their preferences and values. 232 Firstly, the
purpose of a decision aid is to “analyze the latest clinical evidence
regarding the risks and benefits of different treatment options and
224. Robert M. Kaplan, Shared Medical Decision Making: A New Tool for
Preventative Medicine, 26 AM. J. PREV. MED. 81, 81 (2004).
225. Id.
226. Health in France, supra note 222, at 307.
227. Id.
228. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 466.
229. Id.
230. Gil Siegal, Richard J. Bonnie & Paul S. Appelbaum, Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients’ Needs in the Informed Consent process, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 359, 361 (2012).
231. Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 91; for example, the DartmouthHitchcock Medical Center has created a Center for Shared Decision Making.
The Dartmouth model includes: “(1) a video decision aid; (2) an online survey
and written questionnaire; (3) optional additional resources to help in resolving
decisional conflict; (4) shared decision-making communication process; and (5)
post-treatment survey.”
232. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 464.
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then present the information in a manner patients understand.”233
Thus, the patient will be given the information regarding the advantages and disadvantages of each medical option that is available
to him in an unbiased manner. 234 Secondly, the patient might be
assisted in making the medical decisions by decision coaches. 235
These individuals help the patient identify the values and the preferences in the medical treatment, so that the patient will be able to
have a meaningful conversation with the physician, later in the
process. 236 Thus, this phase takes place before the patient’s meeting with the physician. 237
Not every medical institution has the financial means to resort
to decision aids and decision coaches and that they are not available for every major medical decision. 238 However, scholars have
argued that, while preferable, decision aids are not essential to the
implementation of shared medical decision-making, as there are
other resources that provide physicians with the needed up-to-date
information. 239
The physician and the patient should together “construct a care
space.” 240 Hence, the two actors should engage in a consultation,
during which the patient’s treatment preferences together with the
physician’s medical opinion will be mutually exchanged. This interaction can be described as a two-way street, where the information flows from both the physician and the patient. For example,
in the Netherlands, the patient has the duty to communicate his
preferences and values to the physician, as he “‘needs to do the
best to his knowledge’ to inform the practitioner and cooperate

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 463-64.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 91.
King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 465.
Id.
Health in France, supra note 222, at 308.
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with him in as far as is reasonable needed for his treatment.”241
However, one may highlight that no obligation to disclose should
be imposed to the patient, as the requirement to provide personal
information conflicts with his right to privacy. 242 Hence, the patient’s rights to keep silence with respect to his preferences and
values should be respected. 243 Nonetheless, in case the patient’s
desire is to communicate his particular situation to the physician,
except for the fact that such possibility should be provided by the
law, the patient should also be provided with aid 244 in order to
properly identify his preferences and values.
Generally, there is mistrust on the part of physicians because
they fear that patients might feel anxious after the information is
provided. 245 Moreover, the literature contends that there is little in
the physicians’ medical training and experience that could prepare
them to “sense how patients will react to disclosures.” 246 Thus, the
summary report that is done after the first step of the process helps
the physician to identify the suitable level of disclosure with respect to the patient’s needs and his physical comfort. 247
There are four possible outcomes with respect to the possibility
to reach an agreement between the physician and the patient regarding the medical procedure to be undertaken. First, the parties
arrive at a mutual medical decision. 248 Second, the patient chooses
to undergo a specific procedure, with which the physician disagrees, but he will provide nonetheless. 249 Third, no agreement is
reached, so the patient seeks medical care elsewhere. 250 Fourth, the
241. Ivo Giesen & Esther Engelhard, Medical Liability in the Netherlands, in
MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS,
supra note 21, at 361, 389-90.
242. KATZ, supra note 14, at 127.
243. Id.
244. See Siegal, Bonnie & Appelbaum, supra note 230.
245. Health in France, supra note 222, at 308.
246. KATZ, supra note 14, at 77.
247. Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 91.
248. Id. at 89.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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patient can choose to differ the treatment choice to the physician. 251 Whichever conclusion is going to be drawn, it is more likely that the medical procedure chosen will be adequate for the patient’s individual values and preferences and the physician will not
be held liable for the failure to provide the relevant information in
order to allow the patient to make an intelligent decision.
At the end of the discussion, the physician will provide a consent form for the patient to sign that acknowledges that the parties
successfully engaged in shared medical decision-making and, finally, reached a conclusion regarding the medical procedure. 252
The value of the consent form has been discussed in many jurisdictions. For example, in Italy, the jurisprudence held that the
duty to inform is not “a mere ‘bureaucratic step,’” 253 as the patient’s consent has to be expressed based on comprehensible information. 254 Moreover, in England, the British Medical Association “tool kit” underlines the importance of the discussion with the
patient and emphasizes that the written consent form should be
seen as a supplement to rather than a substitute of the dialog. 255
Scholars have identified a set of benefits of shared medical decision-making. 256 Firstly, from the patient’s standpoint, shared
medical decision-making enhances his autonomy, as it satisfies the
need for adequate information and engagement in the medical discussion. 257 Studies have shown that “the vast majority of patients
want to be informed and involved in medical decision-making.”258
However, there is no evidence that the patient strongly desires to
251. Id.
252. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 466.
253. Alessandro P. Scarso & Massimo Foglia, Medical Liability in Italy, in
MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS,
supra note 21, at 329, 346-47.
254. Id.
255. Taylor, supra note 119, at 473.
256. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 468.
257. Id.
258. Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 89 (citing W. Levinson et al., Not
All Patients Want to Participate in Decision-Making: A National Study of Public
Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 531, 335 (2005).
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remove annihilate the physician’s integral part of the medical decisions. 259 Thus, after receiving the information that the patient
wants, he has the possibility to determine whether he will defer the
decision entirely to the physician or make a final determination
with the collaboration of the physician. 260 Moreover, various studies have shown that by increasing the patient’s involvement in the
medical decision-making, he will reach psychological comfort,
which will contribute to the patient’s well-being. 261 Furthermore,
some studies have shown that the involvement of the patients in
medical decisions has improved the treatment outcomes. 262
Secondly, from the physician’s point of view, shared medical
decision-making will provide insights on what the patient’s preferences and values need to be taken into consideration when the disclosure is given. 263 Thus, the law will give a clearer standard of
disclosure. In addition, the physician’s medical liability should be
heavily reduced because of the extensive communication with the
patient and the better perception of goals. 264 Moreover, the ample
discussions in which the physician and the patient engage will
tighten the bonds between them. Thus, less stress is placed on the
medical professional when he performs the chosen procedure. 265
Skeptics, who have spoken against the potential benefits of the
shared medical decision-making, argue that the implementation of
such standard raises important challenges. 266
Firstly, the management of the physician’s time seems to be
one of the major concerns. 267 It has been contended that physicians

259. Id.
260. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 468.
261. For more details, see id. at 469.
262. Pamela J. Mendonca & Sharon S. Brehm, Effects of Choice on Behavioral Treatment of Overweight Children, 1 J. SOC. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 343, 343-358
(1983).
263. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 471.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 90.
267. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 473.
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do not have the time to explain every detail to patients. 268 These
obstacles are not insurmountable. 269 For example, by adopting decision aids, or other decision management tools, such as a decision
coach, the physician will save a lot of time. Thus, the physician
will not be required to gather and provide information to the patient, in order for the latter to be able to engage in a productive
communication. 270 Even if there is definitely an “initial time investment” 271 designed to favor the training of physicians to properly take part in shared medical decision-making, this investment
will profit in the long run by reducing the overall time needed for
the delivery of information. 272
Secondly, it has been contended that even if physicians had the
time to properly engage in shared medical decision-making, they
are not paid for the time spent discussing the risks with patients.273
Moreover, implementing shared medical decision-making may result in “a reduction in medical services as many patients would
forego care if they had all the facts.” 274 Thus, physicians will be
rewarded with less financial support because of fewer treatment
requests. 275 However, engaging in shared medical decision-making
will potentially lower the number of malpractice claims, as it is
more probable than not that this standard of disclosure will be a
solution to the communication difficulties that physicians and patients face. 276
In conclusion, despite the criticism that might be brought to the
idea of adopting shared medical decision-making as a standard of
disclosure in the United States and France, there is definitely a
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 473.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 90.
274. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 474.
275. Id.
276. The communication defects in the relationship between the physician
and the patient are said to be among the most common complaints from patients
who sue physicians for malpractice. Id.
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need to adapt the actual legal standards of disclosure, in both jurisdictions, to meet society’s demands. The robust mechanism of this
innovative idea may be the best, if not perfect, compromise between the patient’s autonomy277 and the physician’s expertise and
beneficence. 278
Back to our leading hypothetical, under the shared medical decision-making, the patient would have had the opportunity to discuss the medical procedure in depth with the physician and ask
questions relating to it during the first two steps of the process.
Hence, Paul would have had the possibility to identify and share
his values and preferences with Dr. Medicus (i.e., the fact that he
plays the piano, hence his finger’s mobility is very important to his
lifestyle). The risk of nerve damage would have ultimately been
disclosed to the patient. Therefore, Paul would have been able to
give a proper informed consent to the medical procedure (whether
he ultimately decides to undergo surgery or not). Although, Paul’s
preferences are unlikely to be shared by other patients, it is not impossible that some of them feel the same way. Dr. Medicus should
nevertheless express his opinion regarding the treatment that best
fits with the personal values of the patient. If, for instance, the physician has a strong preference for a certain procedure (the surgery,
for example), which is not consented by the patient, Dr. Medicus
has no authority to force Paul to undergo treatment. On the other
hand, if under the same scenario, Paul is aware of the possible risk
of nerve damage and consents to the surgery, he would give an informed consent. He would be prepared psychologically for the unlikely result that might occur and could not claim damages for the
physician’s failure to inform him about the risk.
277. Respecting the patient’s autonomy can be defined as recognizing their
“wishes regarding what information is relevant to their decision and how much
they want to participate” in the decision-making process. Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 89.
278. The ethical obligation of the physician to act with beneficence was expressed as his duty to assist the “patients to select both a decision-making pathway and a treatment option that best satisfies their personal and medical goals.”
Id.
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To conclude, by implementing shared medical decision-making
in the United States and France, the cases in which physicians
would be held liable for failure to disclose risks to patients would
be substantially reduced and the patient’s autonomy would be protected against any illegal intrusion.
CONCLUSION
It takes a global view to properly understand the duty to disclose imposed on the physician by the doctrine of informed consent. This paper covers a common law jurisdiction, the United
States, and a civil law jurisdiction, France, while offering crossreferences to other jurisdictions.
Firstly, in the United States, in case the patient gives his consent to the medical procedure, but he is not sufficiently informed
beforehand, there are two lines of cases addressing the scope of the
physician’s duty to disclose the risks intrinsic to the procedure: the
professional standard and the prudent patient-based standard. The
latter is divided into two sub standards: the objective and the subjective patient-based standard. The professional standard determines the physician’s duty by asking: what would a reasonable
physician disclose to a patient under similar circumstances? The
approach differs under the patient-based standard that establishes
the duty to disclose by referring to the needs of a reasonable patient (under the objective approach), or by referring to the individual patient (as the subjective substandard requires).
Secondly, in France, the Cour de cassation held that the duty to
inform the patient has its fundament in the requirement to respect
the constitutional principle of human dignity. Moreover, the patient’s right to information was reinforced by the enactment of the
Law of March 4, 2002. Thus, each individual has the right to be
informed about “the frequent and serious risks” 279 that are “nor279. CODE DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. L1111-2 para. 1.
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mally predictable.” 280 With respect to the definition given by
courts and governmental entities to the serious risks would indicate
that, in France, the standard of disclosure is an objective one, although there is no profound analysis on this matter. 281 It was contended that French lawyers are more at ease with the use of abstract principles than common law lawyers.
Criticisms have been brought to the actual standards of disclosure. Skeptics claim that under the professional standard, the physician is given discretion as the information process is regarded as
a question of professional judgment. Moreover, it was contemplated that the objective patient-based standard assumes that all patients assess similarly the risks and benefits of a medical procedure, thus the right to self-determination is not protected. Furthermore, critique was brought to the subjective patient-based standard
because it eliminates the protection given to physicians by the objective standard. Hence, the general inference is that the standard
of disclosure, i.e., the duty to inform, does not respect the “modern
medical practice” 282 and the “individual autonomy rights” 283 of
patients.
Keeping in mind that the principles of medical ethics (autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice) 284 and human rights
(patient’s ability to exercise self-determination) should guide the
legal development of the doctrine of informed consent, 285 this paper proposed, in a non-exhaustive manner, the addition of two alternative legal standards of disclosure.
Firstly, in order to overcome the criticism that the subjective
patient-based standard does not adequately protect the physician
from unwanted liability, embracing into tort law the content of the
280. G’Sell-Macrez, supra note 120, at 1101.
281. Taylor, supra note 119, at 475.
282. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 480.
283. Id. at 490.
284. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12 (5th ed. 2001).
285. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 434.
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notion of error, as a vice of consent, might be a feasible solution.
Thus, the new “mixed” standard should require the physician to
disclose the relevant information to the particular patient (not to a
reasonable patient, as the objective standard requires), if the obligor of the duty to inform, i.e., the physician, knows or should have
reasonably known that the special risk is important to the patient.
This standard has the advantage that the right of self-determination
of the patient is respected, as he is given personalized information.
Moreover, the law protects the physician: in case he does not know
or has no reasonable reasons to know that the risk is important to
the patient, he will not be held liable for the failure to disclose such
risk.
Secondly, implementing a new standard, known as the shared
medical decision-making, may be a key to achieve the goals of the
doctrine of informed consent. The shared medical decisionmaking, by engaging both the physician and the patient in the process of deciding on the medical treatment or procedure, makes
possible the communication of patient’s treatment preferences, on
the one hand, and the physician’s medical opinion, on the other
hand. Hence, from the patient’s standpoint, shared medical decision-making enhances his autonomy, satisfies his need of adequate
information and engagement in the medical discussion. From the
physician’s point of view, shared medical decision-making will
provide an understanding on what are the values and the preferences of the patient. The physician will then be able to disclose the
relevant information to the particular patient and avoid unlimited
liability for the failure to disclose the material risks.
The deficiencies found in United States law and in French law
may be solved by applying, as an incremental step towards reaching the goals of the doctrine of informed consent, the “mixed”
standard of disclosure. Meanwhile, the legal and economic framework of the countries will be able to implement the medical and
legal national infrastructure to adopt properly and successfully
shared medical decision-making.
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We hope that this analysis provides lawmakers the legal arena
with useful insights. While being careful to not swing the pendulum too far in favor of either party (i.e., the patient or the physician), we believe that more in depth research ought to be undertaken in order for the proposed alternative standards of disclosure to
be integrated into different legal systems across the world.

